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Rector Magnificus, Ladies and gentlemen,
Introduction
In 2007 a number of organisations teamed up to establish Holland 
Financial Centre (HFC), a foundation that aims to promote the Dutch 
financial sector1. One of its key objectives is the promotion – in particular 
abroad - of pensions and retirement management as one of the corner 
stones of the Dutch financial industry. The initiatives of HFC are in 
the vein of similar programmes launched in Ireland, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. 
The efforts of HFC raise a number of questions. First, what are the 
unique selling points of the Dutch pension system that make pensions 
a product worthwhile exporting abroad? Second, HFC was established 
before the financial “tsunami” hit the shores of our economy. Should 
exporting the Dutch pension system still be a priority under the current 
circumstances, as also questioned by De Nederlandsche Bank2?  Third, if 
the business concept to be exported is clear, which countries’ grounds 
are most fertile for the Dutch model?
All these questions will be addressed in this lecture. As the focus of 
my chair is on European economic policy, I will in particular discuss 
the exportability or transferability of the Dutch pension system to the 
countries of the European Union (EU). Indeed, there is a growing need 
for reform of pension systems in the EU, against the background of an 
ageing population and the lack of funded pension schemes in many EU 
Member States (European Commission, 2006).
1 Stichting HFC was founded by the Ministry of Finance, De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek,
 Robeco, Euronext, ING Group, Aegon, Rabobank, Kas Bank, ABN AMRO, De Nederlandsche
 Bank, Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, Shell Asset Management, KPMG, Fortis, Loyens en Loeff, 
 Nauta Dutilh, Deloitte, IMC, Eureko, Van der Moolen, Stichting Pensioenfonds PGGM, 
 MN Services, Stichting Philips Pensioenfonds, Allen & Overy, Delta Lloyd, Optiver, SNS 
 Reaal, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Stibbe, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
 Ernst & Young, Cordares, Stichting Unilever Pensioenfonds, Ministry of Economic Affairs
 and the Ministry of Justice. 
2 “Nederland als financieel centrum”, speech delivered by A.J. Kellermann, member of the
 Executive Board of De Nederlandsche Bank N.V., on 4 December 2008.  
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It is important to note that – in the context of this lecture - the exportability 
of the Dutch pension system refers to funded pension arrangements, 
and notably the so-called second pillar schemes. Indeed, exportability of 
the Dutch system is intrinsically linked to the need in many European 
countries to move from a pay-as-you-go system to funded pension 
schemes. Transferability of the pay-as-you-go, first pillar is not considered 
in this lecture3. In addition, exportability – al least for the purpose of this 
lecture – is limited to services provided by so-called Pension Delivery 
Organisations (PDOs)4, i.e. organisations that provide asset management 
as well as pension administration services to pension funds. In other words, 
we do not discuss possible cross-border activities of Dutch and European 
pension funds, or IORPs5. Neither do we discuss the level playing field (or 
possible lack of it) in the European Union when considering establishing a 
pan-European pension fund, but take the regulatory framework in the EU 
Member States as given.
Some may argue that this lecture is about the international business case of 
a PDO, under the pretext of academic research. This is partially true. However, 
there is definitely more at stake, as will become clear. The exportability or 
transferability of the Dutch model is also intrinsically linked to the future of 
the Dutch pension system in a European and international context.
First, I will address the unique selling points of the Dutch pension 
system, in particular of the so-called second pillar. Second, I will define 
the pension related products that could be exported. Third, I will answer 
the question why the exportability of the Dutch pension system is still a 
topical issue, despite the financial crisis. Next, I will give a short overview 
of the pension landscape in the European Union. Finally, I will present 
some new research on what we have labelled the transferability of the 
Dutch pension system to the Member States of the European Union; a 
joint effort of Alexander Schwan, one of my students, and myself. I will 
end this lecture with some concluding comments and – last but not least 
– acknowledgements of the persons that, in one way or the other, have 
supported me in the process leading to my appointment. 
3 Which does not necessarily imply that EU Members States could not adopt elements of 
 the Dutch first pillar, i.e. the AOW (Algemene Ouderdomswet). 
4 A term which has been introduced by Keith Ambachtsheer at the DNB/Netspar/IoPS
 Conference, “Frontiers in Pension Finance and Reform”, in March 2007.
5 Institution for Occupational Retirement Provision. 
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Unique Selling Points of the Dutch pension system
The first question that should be addressed in the context of this 
lecture, is which elements make the Dutch pension system eligible for 
transferability across the Dutch borders. In other words, what are the 
Unique Selling Points (USPs) of the Dutch pension system?
Before addressing the USPs it is important to note – as already mentioned 
in the introduction – that we only focus on the so-called funded pension 
arrangements, in particular the second pillar. When classifying a country’s 
pension system, a distinction can be made between three or four 
so-called pillars, in line with the classification introduced by the World 
Bank (1994). The first pillar comprises pay-as-you go schemes financed 
by the government (taxes or social security related contributions). The 
second pillar consists of occupational retirement provisions that are – 
in principle – fully funded and that are linked to the plan participants’ 
occupational status. The third pillar comprises funded schemes that 
are arranged between a financial institution and an individual person. 
Participation in third pillar schemes is always voluntary. Sometimes, a 
distinction is also made between the third and the fourth pillar. Third 
pillar schemes are facilitated by tax measures; fourth pillar schemes are 
individual schemes for which no favourable tax regimes are in place. 
Table 1 below gives an overview of the Dutch pension system, structured 
in line with the World Bank model.
It is generally acknowledged that a balanced distribution of benefits over 
the first and the other pillars is to be preferred6. Pay-as-you go schemes are 
in particular vulnerable for demographic developments. Funded schemes, 
on the other hand, are less susceptible to ageing of the population. However, 
funded schemes are vulnerable for (high) inflation and financial downturns, 
eroding the value of the pension savings. In case of pay-as-you-go schemes, 
inflation is less an issue, as the increase in benefits can be financed by 
an increase in taxes or public debt, of which the latter can be “inflated 
away”. This also implies that countries with high pension savings have a 
strong interest in monetary and financial stability, as represented by an 
independent central bank aiming at price stability. Countries that rely mostly 
on pay-as-you-go schemes for financing their old-age financial benefits are, 
6 In The Netherlands the first pillar provides approximately half of the pension benefits; 
 the other half is provided by the second and third pillar (Börsch-Supan, 2004). 
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on the other hand, expected to have a smaller interest in monetary stability. 
As a matter of fact, against the background of an ageing population and 
an increased pressure on pay-as-you-go schemes, the authorities of these 
countries may think they are better off with inflationary monetary policies.
Table 1: Overview of the Dutch pension system
(1) DB or Defined Benefit schemes are characterised by a pre-defined benefit at the age of 
retirement; DC or Defined Contribution schemes do not have a pre-defined benefit, but are 
characterised by a fixed and predefined contribution rate. The benefits at the age of retirement 
depend, among other things, on financial market developments.
First pillar 
AOW
Second pillar
Occupational 
pension funds
Third pillar
Individual pension 
arrangements
Participation Mandatory – all 
Dutch residents
Mandatory – 
all workers at 
organisations that 
have established an 
occupational pension 
fund (> 90% of the 
workforce)
Voluntary
Financing AOW contribution 
and general taxes 
(pay-as-you-go)
Contribution (funded) Contribution (funded)
Parties involved Government, Sociale 
Verzekeringsbank and 
Dutch residents
Social partners, 
pension fund and 
individual worker
Financial institution 
and individual person
Tax treatment No special 
treatment
Contribution rates 
are tax deductible (up 
to a certain amount)
Contribution rates 
are tax deductible (up 
to a certain amount)
Benefits Fixed amount, 
dependent on (among 
other things) marital 
status and number of 
years resided in The 
Netherlands (accrual 
rate is 2% per year, 
between the age of 
15 to 65)
Replacement rate of, 
in most cases, 80% of 
the average annual 
salary over a period of  
(a career of) 40 years, 
including the first 
pillar benefit (hybrid 
DB scheme) (1)
Replacement 
rate depends on 
contribution and 
developments on 
financial markets
(DC scheme)
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The focus on the second pillar in this lecture should be seen against the 
background of the necessity prevailing in many EU Member States to shift 
from predominantly pay-as-you go systems to supplementary funded 
pension schemes. So far, most EU countries have relied on pay-as-you 
go schemes, with the exception of the Nordics, the United Kindom and 
Ireland, although still to a lesser extent than The Netherlands. Notably 
some EU countries in Central and Eastern Europe have undertaken major 
reforms of their pension system, thereby moving to funded schemes. 
However, in most cases, these reforms imply a shift from pay-as-you go 
to traditional individual defined contribution arrangements, i.e. third 
pillar arrangements. In this respect The Netherlands stand out, as the 
funded pillars are characterised by a predominance of the second pillar, 
i.e. collectively organised schemes.
There is a host of literature on the advantages of the Dutch funded 
pension arrangements over similar schemes in other countries. Most of 
this literature focuses on the benefits of  the second pillar, as opposed 
to the third pillar. A good overview is provided by Steenbeek and Van der 
Lecq (2007).
First, the Dutch second pillar schemes provide for intergenerational 
solidarity, which is lacking in third pillar arrangements. Intergenerational 
solidarity relates to the fact that financial as well as other risks can be 
shared among generations, i.e. young versus old, and even provides 
for the possibility to share risks between current plan beneficiaries 
and unborn future generations. The advantages of intergenerational 
solidarity are estimated to be substantial7.
A second advantage of Dutch second pillar schemes relates to their 
cost efficiency related to their efficacy. Pension funds are more efficient 
than insurance companies in providing similar pension arrangements 
(Bikker and De Dreu, 2007). This is mainly due to the fact that pension 
funds are not-for-profit organisations that do not incur marketing 
costs or have to comply with investors’ demand for a specific return on 
7 See Bonenkamp et al. (2007) for an overview of the relevant literature. In terms of pension 
 assets, estimates of the benefits of intergenerational risk sharing are in a range of 
 0 to 30%, In terms of life cycle income of a generation, benefits are estimated to be 6%. 
 Defined in terms of the certainty equivalent consumption, the welfare gains of collective 
 pension schemes can amount to 4%.
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equity. On average, the costs of pension funds are 0.15% of the assets; 
for insurance companies, costs amount to 1.27% of the assets. In other 
words, the pension benefit provided by insurance companies is 26% less, 
ceteris paribus, than the benefit provided by pension funds. Moreover, 
larger pension funds are even more cost efficient, as the management of 
pension schemes very much relies on economies of scale. Large pension 
funds, like ABP, are eight times as efficient than smaller ones. 
Thirdly, participants in (hybrid) DB schemes are not confronted with 
the so-called conversion risk, contrary to DC plan members. DC plan 
members are supposed to convert their savings into a life annuity at 
the age of retirement. The pension benefit originating from this annuity 
to a large extent depends on the market interest rate at the date of 
conversion. If the interest rate is high, the plan participant will be able 
to acquire an annuity providing a relatively high benefit. The opposite 
is true when interest rates are relatively low. In general terms, a one 
percentage point lower interest rate implies a drop in pension benefits 
of approximately 7 %. DB plan members are not confronted with this risk, 
in the sense that the conversion risk is spread out over time among all 
plan members.
A fourth advantage of the Dutch second pillar should be seen in the 
context of the so-called behavioural finance literature. A good overview 
is provided by Van Els et al. (2007) and Van Rooij et al. (2007) The 
experience with individual DC schemes in, for instance, the United 
Kingdom and the United States (for the latter, see Munnell and Sunden, 
2004) show that DC plan members are often not able to take rational 
decisions, thereby seriously undermining the efficacy of their plans. It is 
very often the case that DC plan members save too little, or start saving 
too late in their careers. The possibility – if it exists - to withdraw pension 
savings when switching jobs is very often used, notably by low-income 
plan members (who are to suffer most in case of inadequate pension 
savings). In addition, in those cases in which plan members have to take 
the investment decisions themselves, irrational decisions can very often 
be observed. Plan members do seldom realise that investments need 
to be rebalanced, or should be switched from risk-bearing to more risk-
averse assets when they approach their retirement. Well-known is also 
the so-called Enron case: Enron plan members of all ages had heavily 
invested their pensions savings in their own company’s stock. Hence, 
when Enron failed, pension schemes became worthless as well. A good 
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example of irrational behaviour is also provided by the early days of the 
pension reform in Sweden (Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004). Plan members 
were given the possibility to choose from a large number of investment 
funds in which they could invest their savings, presented in a catalogue 
that was provided to all plan members. It appeared that most plan 
members opted for investment funds that were presented first in the 
catalogue, as they apparently were not very keen on spending much 
time on absorbing the full set of information. Finally, DC plan members 
responsible for their own investment decisions very often seem to suffer 
from a so-called “home bias”, in the sense that most investments are 
done in domestic stock, very often of sectors they know and companies 
they are familiar with. In other words, many investment portfolios are 
not well diversified. Hence, and as also been argued in the behavioural 
finance literature, plan members are much better of if they can delegate 
investment decisions to professionals or if they are offered a default 
option, managed by investment professionals. Indeed, members of 
Dutch pension funds cannot determine their own asset allocation. The 
advantages of the opportunity to determine asset allocations individually 
are – at least according to the proponents of the behavioural finance 
literature - much smaller than the advantages of having professionals 
at the pension fund managing the pension fund assets.
Last but not least, it is important to note that participation in Dutch 
pension funds is mandatory. This key element of the Dutch system 
has two dimensions. First, individual employees of an organisation 
are automatically enrolled as plan members, if that organisation has 
established a pension scheme or is a member of a multi-employer fund. 
Second, employers that are part of a particular sector are obliged to join – 
under certain circumstances – a multi-employer fund8. As a result, more 
than 90% of all Dutch workers is in one way or the other participating 
in a pension scheme. Mandatory participation appears to be one of 
the corner stones of a successful pension system, providing adequate 
replacement rates. The drawback of mandatory participation is the lack 
of choice for individuals and the, at first sight, non-existence of a level 
playing field between pension funds and other financial institutions. 
However, the latter appears to be not the case in The Netherlands, as 
confirmed by the European Court of Justice, as mandatory participation 
8 The first dimension is known as the “kleine verplichtstelling” (mandatory employee 
 enrolment); the second as the “grote verplichtstelling” (mandatory employer enrolment).
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is necessary to secure a sufficient degree of collective risk sharing 
(Drijber, 2007).  
Given the advantages of the Dutch second pillar, one might question 
why the Dutch model has not already been adopted by many countries 
worldwide. As a matter of fact, the opposite appears to be the case. 
Pension systems in countries that were similar to the Dutch system, such 
as in the United States and the United Kingdom, appear to be in retreat. 
The Dutch (hybrid) DB model can best be depicted as a “DB island in a 
sea of DC”. The Dutch system is increasingly becoming the “odd one out”. 
There are several reasons for this development, some originating from 
within The Netherlands, other having a global or European background.
First, pension funds have traditionally not been very effective in 
marketing themselves and branding their own product. Given mandatory 
participation, there has for quite a long time also been no need for active 
public relations. The neglect of public relations efforts appears to be the 
drawback of a not-for-profit orientation and the cost efficiency of pension 
funds. In addition to poor  branding efforts, it can also be questioned 
whether the interest groups representing the Dutch pension sector have 
always been effective in their lobby and public relations activities. Indeed, 
the interests of all pension funds are represented by three separate 
organisations, all of them having only limited resources compared to 
the associations representing commercial financial institutions9. Recent 
efforts to increase cooperation between these organisations should 
hence be applauded. The incompetence of pension funds to proliferate 
themselves is inversely matched by the public relations efforts of 
commercial financial institutions, notably insurance companies, that 
have increased their efforts to, among other things, question the 
legitimacy of mandatory pension fund participation in order to increase 
the share of third pillar arrangements to the detriment of the second 
pillar. These efforts appear to have antagonised pension funds, making 
them more effective and successful in defending their case.
The Dutch second pillar also appears to have become more “exotic”, as 
at the global level the importance of the third pillar and/or (hybrid) DC 
9 Multi-employer funds are represented by the “Vereniging van Bedrijfstakpensioenfondsen”, 
 company funds by the “Stichting voor Ondernemingspensioenfondsen” and so-called 
 pension funds for professions by the “Unie van beroepspensioenfondsen”. 
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schemes has gradually increased. There are two reasons for this. First, the 
“dot com” crisis in 2001 and its resulting impact on the financial position 
of pension funds worldwide made many companies decide to abandon 
DB schemes and to switch to individual DC arrangements, either in 
the context of a pension fund or as part of the third pillar. In addition 
to financial market developments, companies were also triggered by 
changes in accounting standards. The so-called IFRS rules require that 
companies listed on the stock exchange account for their pension 
assets and liabilities on their respective balance sheet if the pension 
scheme can be characterised as a DB scheme. This is not necessary for 
DC schemes, because in that case employees bear all the risks involved 
(and no longer the company). In 1983 more than 60% of employees in 
the United States were member of a DB plan. In 2004, the situation had 
been completely reversed and more than 60% of employees participated 
in an individual DC scheme (Munnell and Sunden, 2004).
Finally, as the Dutch system is becoming more “exotic”, international 
and European legislation and/or regulation is not helping to reverse the 
trend. A good example in this respect is provided by the discussion on 
the applicability of Solvency II – the solvency framework for insurance 
companies in the EU – to pension funds. In particular in 2008 a debate 
emerged as to whether the EU solvency framework for insurance 
companies should also apply to pension funds, which would have 
seriously aggravated the demands pension funds would have to face. 
Besides insurance companies, that were using this opportunity to lobby 
for the application of Solvency II to pension funds foremost in order to 
increase their share of the pension market, not many policy makers or 
Members of the European Parliament were aware of the consequences 
application of Solvency II would have on pension funds in the EU. For many 
of them, extending Solvency II to pension funds fitted very well with the 
ambitions to protect consumers. They did not realise that pension funds 
are completely different animals than insurance companies and that 
treating pension funds as insurance companies would eventually harm 
consumers’ interests (EFRP, 2008). After a successful lobby, both the 
European Commission and the European Parliament have agreed not to 
pursue the application of Solvency II to pension funds any further. The 
same line of reasoning holds for the discussion on the IFRS accounting 
rules and the so-called Portability Directive, that was designed to 
increase the portability of pension rights across EU borders. Also in 
these cases the intentions of policy makers were not necessarily wrong. 
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However, and without going too much in details, in both cases the Dutch 
interests have not been served very well. The fact that The Netherlands is 
not the point of reference in the EU when it comes to pensions appears 
to be one of the reasons for these developments.   
 
Exportability of the Dutch pension system
The USPs of the Dutch second pillar suggest that it might be worthwhile 
to export the Dutch model ”one on one” to other countries, notably to 
countries which should take steps to reform their pension system. This 
conclusion would, however, be too simple and too naïve. As indeed 
argued above, the Dutch model appears to be in retreat. Moreover, it 
should not be neglected that the Dutch pension system has evolved 
over time in what it constitutes today, including all kind of peculiarities 
that may be typical for The Netherlands, but that are not necessarily 
exportable10.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to disentangle the Dutch model into a 
number of products or services that can be provided, also in a more 
general and international context. As already mentioned before, the 
focus in this respect is on services to be provided by so-called Pension 
Delivery Organisations (PDOs), and not so much on pension funds 
themselves. Indeed, the establishment of pan-European pensions funds, 
providing pension benefits to employees in several EU Member States, is 
a different issue and is not discussed here. Figure 1 below gives a stylised 
overview of the business activities of a PDO, based on the balance sheet 
of a pension fund. 
10 The first pension schemes in The Netherlands were introduced in the 19th century. 
 The foundations of modern pension funds, as we know them today, were laid in the 
 first decades of the 20th century (ABP, 2007).
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Figure 1: The business model of a PDO
As regards the assets of the pension fund, a PDO typically provides asset 
management services, either as a fiduciary manager or as a fully-fledged 
asset manager. Activities include advisory functions, such as asset and 
liability management, and the formulation of (strategic) investment 
plans, external manager selection, (internal) asset management, risk 
management and reporting. As far as the liabilities of the pension fund 
are concerned, the PDO typically provides administrative services, both 
to the pension fund as well as to the plan members, communication 
with respect to the pension rights of plan members, the collection of 
contributions into the fund as well as the payment of pension benefits. 
The PDO is also typically involved in accounting and actuarial activities, 
resulting in reports to the supervisor as well as the funds’ annual report. 
In addition, the PDO may provide advisory functions to the Board of 
Trustees regarding legal, financial, fiscal and actuarial issues. PDOs may 
provide services related to both pension funds’ balance sheets activities, or 
only be involved in either asset management or pension administration. 
Typically, the relationship between the PDO and the pension fund is 
managed by an account manager or account management team, either 
organised as a separate function, or as part of the asset management or 
pension administration functions of the PDO. 
Account management
Liabilities
Pension administration
Assets
Asset management
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The business concept of a PDO is very much linked to the Dutch pension 
sector and it is not necessarily the case that these functions can 
automatically be transferred to an international context. In addition, 
it is important to distinguish which elements are “typical Dutch”, in 
the sense that PDOs have a competitive advantage in providing these 
services compared to other (international) service organisations. 
Obviously, Dutch PDOs might provide asset management services to 
pension funds abroad, or to individuals, in case of third pillar products. 
As a matter of fact, this market appears to rather homogeneous and 
most players are active at a global scale. The characteristics of the 
pension deal – DB or DC, collective or individual – are less important; 
fiscal and legal issues may be relevant, but most asset managers are able 
to provide tailor-made solutions, also because fiscal and legal isues are 
often already tackled by providing a harmonised framework at EU level. 
The value-added of the Dutch PDOs in this respect relates to expertise 
and costs. Dutch PDOs have a long-standing tradition with respect to 
pension asset management, which distinguishes them from ordinary 
asset managers. Asset management linked to pensions typically has to 
take into account such issues as the duration of the pension liabilities, 
the ambitions of the fund as well as the desired risk profile. Moreover, 
Dutch PDOs should be able to distinguish themselves in terms of 
costs. Given the volume of the assets under management, it should 
be possible to realise substantial economies of scale. An example of a 
potentially successful business case in this respect is provided in Box 1 
below, outlining the cooperation between APG Group and PensPlan, an 
Italian PDO.
With respect to pension administration, the situation is more complicated. 
So far, this business has mainly been locally organised. PDOs that 
are active in this respect internationally always employ local service 
providers. The issue is that – so far – it has not been possible to establish 
a generic pension administration system that can be employed under 
several jurisdictions. Different from asset management services, legal 
and fiscal issues appear to be a bottleneck in this respect. To conclude, 
this market does not appear to be immediately accessible for Dutch 
PDOs, although the potential is huge. However, this would require large 
investments in order to make a generic use of pension administration 
applications possible.
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Box 1: Cooperation between PensPlan and APG Group
PensPlan and APG Group started their collaboration in 2008 as to improve the 
performance of Italian second pillar pension funds. 
By working together with PensPlan, APG Group will contribute to the growth of 
funded pension schemes in Italy. This is important for Italian citizens because it 
reduces their dependency on the present pay-as-you-go schemes. From the Dutch 
perspective it is important that throughout Europe strong funded pension schemes 
are established that help to finance old-age provisions, thereby implicitly supporting 
the Dutch second pillar.
As a regional pension administrator in the north of Italy (Trentino-Alto Adige), 
PensPlan serves a number of Italian pension funds. PensPlan is interested in 
introducing European best practices to Italy with respect to pension fund asset 
management, including risk management and control, asset and liability modelling 
and strategic asset allocation. The cooperation with APG Group offers PensPlan 
access to the scale and expertise of APG Group in pension asset management. 
As a first step of the collaboration APG Group will start to manage own assets of 
PensPlan (€100 million), from the beginning of 2009 onwards. A rapid growth of 
assets under management is expected. Moreover, in 2009 an investment structure 
will be set up for Italian pension funds that are served by PensPlan. As a result, 
Italian pension funds can profit from the economies of scale and extensive know-
how of APG Group in the fields of pension fund asset management. For this purpose, 
APG Group aims at establishing an IORP in The Netherlands. The precise modalities 
of such an IORP are heavily debated in The Netherlands. They could be a means to 
offer pension schemes in Europe an effective and efficient way to manage assets 
and liabilities in a balanced way.
It should also be noted that one of the reasons PensPlan and its sponsoring pension 
funds opted for APG Group is the close link to social partners and the governance 
of Dutch pension funds. Stakeholders of PensPlan feel comfortable with APG group 
because of the alignment of the organisation with pension funds and social partners.
Finally, PDOs can become active internationally by providing advisory services. 
In this respect, Dutch PDOs appear to have a substantial competitive advantage 
over (foreign) competitors, given their experience and expertise. First, PDOs 
may advise on the construct and technicalities of the pension deal, both 
financially as well in terms of governance. Even countries that have opted for 
On the exportability of the Dutch pension system to the European Union18
individual DC schemes can profit from the expertise in terms of financial 
engineering by establishing so-called “smart” DC schemes that should 
allow plan members to mimic the results of classic DB schemes, thereby 
avoiding the pitfalls witnessed in, for instance, the United States. Given 
their specific expertise, PDOs might also help multinational companies, 
often responsible for managing pension schemes in many countries, in 
providing more efficient and effective solutions, for instance by pooling 
pension assets and liabilities. As a matter of fact, all these advisory services 
can be regarded as a stepping stone for asset management or, perhaps, 
pension administration. In other words, although the immediate gains – 
in terms of profit or employment – might be small, they can be the entry 
ticket to providing fully-fledged pension services. 
Table 2 below provides an overview of the services Dutch PDOs might 
provide in an international context. 
Table 2: International services provided by Dutch PDOs
Service Best practices Competitors Value-added by 
Dutch PDOs
Asset 
management
-  ALM and other advisory     
services (e.g. fiduciary  
management)
-  Asset management
-  Risk management
-  Reporting
-  Investment   
banks
-  Global asset  
management  
houses
- Cost-efficiency
-  Experience with pension      
asset management (link to 
liabilities and funds’ ambitions)
-  Involvement of social   
partners (governance)
Pension 
administration
- Collection of contributions
- Administration
- Payment of benefits
- Communication
- Advisory functions (legal, 
  tax, actuarial)
- Reporting
- Actuarial  
  service      
  providers
- Other 
  providers of 
  administrative 
  services
-  Potentially large, given the 
existing experience and 
expertise, but investments 
in development of generic 
applications are necessary
-  Involvement of social
   partners (governance)
Advisory 
functions
- Pension deal construction
-  Financial pension  
engineering
-  Cross-border solutions for 
corporates
- Legal, tax, actuarial
-  Investment 
and actuarial 
consultants
- Collective model (even if DC)
-  Expertise with respect to 
financial pension engineering
-  Involvement of social 
partners (governance)
Dr. Olaf C.H.M. Sleijpen 19
There might – as summarised in Table 2 - also be interest in the experiences 
in term of governance, in particular the role of social partners as well as the 
organisation of collective schemes, even if the underlying plan is of a DC 
nature. First, the Dutch second pillar schemes are based on collective risk 
sharing, not only in terms of mortality rates and the “classical” risks, but 
also in terms of intergenerational risk. Similar risk sharing arrangements 
can also be introduced in DC schemes, at least to some extent. Second, the 
Dutch (governance) model has contributed to a large degree of flexibility 
and pragmatism in managing pension schemes. It is relatively easy to 
adapt pension schemes, as long as social partners agree. For instance, major 
changes were possible in 2001/2002, after the “dot com” crisis, such as the 
introduction of conditional indexation. If such flexibility and pragmatism 
had prevailed in many other countries, such as in the United Kingdom, the 
demise of DB schemes in these countries might have been prevented11. 
International ambitions against the background of the financial crisis
So far, we have concluded that the Dutch pension system avails of a 
number of USPs making it an attractive export product, despite the fact 
that the Dutch pension deal can most likely not be exported “one on one” 
and despite developments that appear to put pressure on, in particular, 
the second pillar. However, the question arises to which extent the USPs 
are still valid, given the financial “tsunami” that has also affected the 
Dutch pension sector12. Moreover, is it still appropriate to consider the 
11 For instance, in the United Kingdom indexation is more or less guaranteed. The fact that 
 this guarantee was  not dropped in the aftermath of the"dot com" crisis, was one of the reasons 
 for the demise of British DB-schemes. As a matter of fact, the United Kingdom is currently 
 considering to introduce conditional indexation in line with The Netherlands.
12 The funding ratio of many pension funds in The Netherlands is close to but lower 
 than 100% (at least at the end of December 2008), in which case one can technically no 
 longer speak of fully funded pension schemes. It should be noted, though, that the funding 
 ratio strongly depends on the valuation of the liabilities of the pension fund. The Pensioenwet, 
 the relevant Dutch pension legislation, requires pension funds to value the liabilities at “fair value”,
 i.e. by discounting the future pension benefits with risk-free market interest rates, 
 corresponding to the liabilities’ duration. However, in other jurisdictions, the regulator accepts 
 valuation of the liabilities at corporate market interest rates or even at expected rates of 
 return on the pension fund’s investments. Application of these valuation rules to the Dutch 
 situation would result in much higher funding ratios than currently reported. This aspect 
 seems to be underestimated in some alarming press reports as well: it warrants, in any 
 case, to put some of the conclusions drawn by the press in perspective.
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exportability of the Dutch pension system when Dutch pension funds 
appear to be in a crisis themselves? Doubts have already been raised 
– e.g. by the Dutch central bank - with respect to the international 
ambitions in the area of pensions: 
“This future [exporting pension products; ed.] is, from the point of view of 
the supervisor, not tomorrow. The execution power and motivation of the 
pension sector should first and foremost focus at addressing the shortfall 
of pension assets. … Hence, a little bit less attention for marketing and the 
display window is currently warranted; first, the shop itself should be put 
in order again.”13(own translation from Dutch).
There are four reasons why, in our view, the international ambitions of 
the Dutch pension sector should not be put on hold.
First, the focus on the impact of the financial crisis on Dutch pension 
funds appears to mask the even more pronounced disarray in the area of 
individual DC14. In other words, the benefits of the Dutch model appear 
to be even more visible under the current circumstances than one or two 
years ago. This can be made clear by a stylised example, comparing the 
Dutch and the US pension systems15. Assume two individuals, Jan Modaal 
(a Dutch employee), and Joe the Plumber (a US worker). Both have reached 
the respectable age of 65 and are about to receive their first monthly 
pension benefit. Jan has since his employment been a member of a 
pension fund that can be characterised as a hybrid DB scheme, the annual 
accrual of his pension being based on the average salary earned and (wage) 
indexation being conditional upon the financial position of the pension 
fund. The accrued benefits represent an annual (gross) pension benefit of 
13 See footnote 2. The original text reads “Die toekomst moet wat ons als toezichthouder 
 betreft nog maar even wachten. De kracht en motivatie van ons pensioenveld moet nu 
 eerst ten volle worden ingezet voor de aanpak van de vermogenstekorten … Even wat minder 
 aandacht voor de marketing en de etalage dus, en eerst de winkel zelf weer goed 
 op orde krijgen”.
14  This is illustrated by anecdotic evidence: when visiting the United States early 
 November 2008, many people indicated that they were “too afraid” to open the 
 envelopes containing their 401K statements (which are typically distributed in the autumn).
15  Adapted from a speech delivered by Dick Sluimers, CEO of APG Group, at a conference 
 (“Eye on Pensions) organised by Ernst & Young on 21 November 2008, “Pension als 
 exportproduct: perspectief vanuit de markt”.
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EUR 12,000, including indexation. Joe has been a member of an individual 
DC plan and avails of assets that, at the eve of his retirement, also represent 
an annual (gross) pension benefit of EUR 12.000, which would result from 
converting the assets into a life-long annuity. Now assume the Dutch and 
US economies are equally affected by a financial crisis that unfolds at the 
moment Jan and Joe retire. Jan’s expected benefit remains the same, i.e. 
EUR 12.000. Under normal circumstances, these benefits would have been 
increased to compensate for in increase in wage indexation, e.g. 2.5%. 
However, as the financial position of the fund has strongly been affected 
by the crisis, its Board of Trustees decides not to provide any indexation 
this year. For Joe the situation is completely different. Not only does the 
financial crisis directly impact the value of his assets (in this example Joe 
is confronted with a loss of 25%), his pension benefits also decrease due to 
a drop in interest rates (e.g. 0.5 %-point), resulting in a lower income from 
the annuity Joe has t0 acquire. As a result, Joe’s expected benefits drop to 
EUR 8,500 per annum. See also Table 3 below.
Table 3: Impact of the financial crisis on pensions: the case of The Netherlands and the United States
The aforementioned impact of the financial crisis is the result immediately 
after retirement. Let’s now take a look at the pension benefits of Jan and 
Joe 25 years later, when both have reached their 80th birthday. Moreover, 
it is assumed that the financial crisis is a one-off event, with the negative 
impact on financial markets and the economy gradually wearing off. 
Jan Modaal (NL) Joe the Plumber (US)
Impact at age 65 
(at retirement)
-  Expected annual pension 
benefit before crisis: EUR 
12,000
-  No indexation (2.5%): EUR 360
-  Expected annual pension 
benefit after crisis: EUR 12,000
-  Expected annual pension 
benefit before crisis: EUR 
12,000
-  Decrease in stock market 
prices (25%): EUR 3,000
-  Conversion loss (-0.5 %-point 
interest rate drop): EUR 500
-  Expected annual pension 
benefit after crisis: EUR 8,500
Impact at age 80 (before the 
financial crisis)
-  Expected annual pension 
benefit: EUR 17,000
-  Expected annual pension 
benefit: EUR 12,000
Impact at age 80 (after the 
financial crisis)
-  Expected pension benefit: 
EUR 17,000
-  Expected pension benefit: 
EUR 8,500
On the exportability of the Dutch pension system to the European Union22
If the financial crisis would not have occurred, Jan would – at the age of 80 
– get an annual benefit of EUR 17,000, representing the initial accrual plus 
wage indexation (2.5% per annum). Joe would have received EUR 12,000, 
the same amount as he would have got immediately after his retirement, 
representing the income from his life-long annuity, that – however – is not 
indexed to wage or price inflation. After the financial crisis, however, the 
situation looks completely different. Jan still is expected to receive EUR 
17,000 per annum. Although he has missed indexation in the year after 
retirement, it is assumed that the financial position of the fund improves 
as the effects of the crisis wear off. Moreover, the advantages of collective 
risk sharing kick in at this point. Eventually, the pension fund is able to 
increase the benefits with the indexation that has been foregone in the 
past. Joe, however, is expected to receive only EUR 8,500 per year, which is 
half of Jan’s pension benefits. Joe had no other choice but to “lock in” the 
negative impact of the financial crisis on his pension savings when he 
retired by buying a life-long annuity, paying him EUR 8,500 per year. The 
only option he would have had to avoid this, is by not having retired at 
the age of 65. He then would have worked longer in order to accumulate 
more pension savings or to wait until the impact of the crisis would have 
worn off. Actually, it appears that this is exactly what is about to happen in 
the United States, people more or less being forced to work longer, hoping 
that the crisis will not last long and that they will keep their jobs16. 
Second, it should not go unmentioned that a number of Dutch PDOs 
are closely linked to pension funds and social partners. These PDOs 
work on the basis of incentives structures that are different from other 
organisations, in the sense that profit maximisation is not the ultimate 
goal of shareholders, the said PDOs have a strong interest in supporting 
the Dutch second pillar and individual incentive structures do not bear 
similarities with the short-term approaches taken in this respect by many 
other financial institutions. In other words, the “back to basics” message 
that appears to penetrate the financial sector worldwide, is already at the 
foundations of many Dutch PDOs. The time has probably never been so 
good as now to get this message across. 
16 The US Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that 30% of the age cohort 65 to 74 will still 
 be working in 2016 as a result of the impact of the financial crisis on individual pensions 
 savings. According to a survey of the AARP (formerly the American Association of Retired 
 Persons), one out of three people being older than 45 years is considering to postpone 
 retirement; one out of five has indicated not having accrued any benefits at all in 2008. 
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Third, as already argued above, the Dutch second pillar is increasingly 
coming under pressure. It is too early yet to speculate on the possible 
impact of the financial crisis on the second pillar, but it is evident that 
there are also structural forces at play that work against collective pension 
arrangements. By exporting the Dutch knowledge with respect to pensions 
abroad, thereby focusing on the merits of the Dutch model, it may be 
possible to strengthen and support the Dutch second pillar. In other 
words, the exportability of the Dutch pension model also has a strategic 
dimension that should not be underestimated (see also Adema, 2008).
Finally, besides these strategic considerations also commercial interests 
are at stake. The Dutch pension market is gradually maturing and Dutch 
PDOs can only grow by focusing on international markets, or – which 
may be the case for asset management – try to regain market share that 
has been lost to foreign institutions.  According to projections by the 
OECD (2007), pension assets are expected to more than double between 
2001 and 2012, from approximately USD 15 trillion to more than USD 30 
trillion. In addition, the Dutch financial sector is and most likely remains 
one of the corner stones of the Dutch economy. The Dutch financial 
industry’s contribution to GDP amounts to 7.3%; direct jobs provided by 
the Dutch financial sector amount to 286.00017.
That efforts to promote the Dutch pension sector should not be stalled, 
does not imply that addressing the impact of the financial crisis on 
Dutch pension funds does not have the highest priority, on the contrary. 
However, from experience it can be argued that it is not a matter of “or”, 
but of “and”. In other words, the international ambitions of PDOs do not 
necessarily impede on the efforts to put things in order domestically.
For instance, and to put things in perspective, the (“core”) unit working 
on international pension solutions at APG Group consists of only a 
very limited group of persons, at a total of approximately 4,000 staff 
members.
The European pension landscape
Before we turn to the transferability of the Dutch model to the EU, it is 
important to sketch the European pension landscape.
17 Stichting Holland Financial Centre (www.hollandfinancialcentre.com).
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The need for pension reform in the EU is the result of demographic 
developments and the high reliance on pay-as-you go, or first pillar 
schemes to finance old-age pensions. Demographic developments 
are impacted by a decrease in fertility rates and, more importantly, an 
increase in life expectancy. According to the European Commission 
(2006), in 2004 a male person in the EU had on average a life 
expectancy of 75.3 years at birth; women were expected to live for 81.5 
years. The most recent Commission projections expect an increase 
in male life expectancy by 6.3 years (to 81.6 years) and an increase in 
female life expectancy by 5.1 years up to 86.6 years. As a result of these 
developments, the so-called old-age dependency ratio, defined as the 
number of people older than 65 years relative to the potential work 
force, i.e. people aged between 15 and 64, is expected to increase. In 2003 
the old-age dependency ratio of the 25 EU Member States was 24%; it is 
expected to increase to 51% in 2050. The impact of these developments 
on pensions in the EU are clear. First, the number of people eligible for 
old-age pensions will increase, both in absolute and relative terms. Table 
4 below gives an overview of the projected increase in public pension 
expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) in the EU between 2004 and 
2050. As can be seen, for practically all EU Member States an increase 
in public pension expenditures is expected, on average by 2.5 %-point of 
GDP. Second, financing of this increase in old-age pensions on the basis 
of current contribution rates will no longer be possible, as the working 
population will, at least in relative terms, decrease over time. 
Without any changes in policy, the increase in public pension expenditures 
will be a burden for public finances in practically all EU Member States. 
An increase in budget deficits or public debts can only be avoided by 
increasing taxes or contribution rates, most likely with a negative impact 
on economic growth. There are several ways to avert this pensions crisis 
in the EU and most Member States have embarked on all of the routes 
described below.
First, efforts can be undertaken to increase the work force – in relative 
terms – compared to the Commission projections, in order to increase 
the base for financing pension benefits in the future. The focus in many 
Member States is on increasing labour participation among female 
workers, still lagging behind compared to the labour participation 
among males, and on promoting labour participation of older workers. 
According to the European Commission (2005a), the employment rate of 
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the potential work force is expected to increase from 63.1% to 70.9%. The 
female employment rate, though, is expected to increase from only 55.4% 
to 65.5%. For older workers, the employment rate is projected to increase 
from 39.9% to 58.9%. Measures to increase female and older workers’ 
labour participation may include, among other things, tax measures and 
measures at promoting the existence and use of child care facilities.
Table 4: Gross public pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP between 2004 and 2050 
(Source: European Commission, 2006)
 
Second, obviously it is also possible to decrease public pension expenditures 
by reforming the scheme itself, i.e. by making it less beneficial from the 
point of view of future beneficiaries. One way of doing this, is to increase 
the age at which people are eligible for pension benefits, as has recently 
been decided by the German government18. One might also decide to 
decrease the pension benefits as such, thereby lowering the so-called 
replacement rate, i.e. the size of the pension benefit relative to the last 
earned income. Besides the fact that this measure is politically not very 
popular, it also puts the expected income of elderly people at risk and 
might increase the poverty risk of this particular group.
18 In Germany it was decided to increase the age of retirement from 65 to 67 years over 
 a period of 24 years: each year the age of retirement will be increased with one month.
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The third group of policy measures aims at increasing so-called private 
pension savings, either by means of second or third pillar arrangements. The 
advantage of these policy measures is that future pension benefits become 
less dependent on demographic developments. Moreover, people will still be 
able to accrue adequate pension benefits, providing them with a reasonable 
income after retirement. In other words, replacement rates are not at risk 
and may even increase over time as savings accumulate. As becomes clear 
from Figure 2 below, the importance of private pension schemes in the EU 
is still relatively limited and a lot remains to be done in this respect19. On 
the basis of Table 5 that gives an overview of the development of pension 
assets in all pension schemes in the EU, similar conclusions can be drawn20. 
It is also clear from Figure 2 and Table 5 that The Netherlands stand out in 
this respect, both in terms of a high participation of employees in private 
pension schemes as well as the size of the pension assets as a percentage 
of GDP. On both accounts, The Netherlands scores highest in the EU.
Figure 2: Percentage of employees contributing to private pension schemes
(Adapted from the European Commission, 2006)
No data for participation in individual schemes are available for Denmark and The Netherlands; for 
Belgium and Ireland the data refer to both occupational and individual pensions.
19 Please note that Figure 2 only relates to employee participation and not to contribution
 rates or replacement rates. In order to get a good overview of the benefits from the second 
 and the third pillar, this information should also be taken into account.
20 Please note that Table 5 also includes assets that relate to first pillar provisions, such as 
 earmarked reserve funds.
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Table 5: Assets in all pension schemes, as a % of GDP
(Source: European Commission, 2006)
This is precisely where the theme of this lecture comes in, the exportability 
of the Dutch pension system to the EU. First, The Netherlands are 
leading other EU Member States with respect to private pension savings. 
Second, and in the context of this lecture perhaps even more important, 
The Netherlands are also frontrunner with respect to second pillar 
pension provisions. Most Member States that have made efforts to 
increase the size of private pension arrangements in their economies, 
notably in Central and Eastern Europe, have done so by promoting 
third pillar (individual) arrangements. However, as already pointed out 
above, there are serious drawbacks of these arrangements compared 
to second pillar pension schemes. It is important to note that some of 
these shortcomings have also been noted in the context of the EU, as 
can be concluded from a study by the EU Social Protection Committee 
(2008), of which the highlights are reproduced in Box 2 below. The Social 
Protection Committee points out in particular the low coverage of many 
private (voluntary) schemes, which is not likely to be increased by tax 
measures, the increase in risk-shifting to individuals as well as the poor 
design of the so-called pay-out phase, which is also a characteristic of 
individual DC schemes. 
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 Box 2: Conclusions regarding privately managed pension schemes
(Source: Social Protection Committee, 2008)
 
HIGHLIGHTS
• As private pension schemes are now used in a number of Member States to achieve 
 the objectives of adequacy and sustainability, it has become essential to analyse 
 the impact of their development on future pension levels.
• Substantial information gaps, lack of harmonised measures and comparable data. 
 Problem of double counting when assessing coverage levels, leading to 
 biased estimates.
• Great variation in coverage and contribution levels between Member States and
 schemes: depending on their role within the overall system, low coverage in 
 supplementary pensions (together with breaks in contributions) can become 
 a cause of concern for future adequacy, in particular for the most vulnerable 
 groups (women, young, lover educated, low-paid).
• Tax incentives not likely to be effective in increasing savings levels in voluntary 
 schemes for the whole population.
• Increasing shift of risks (employment, longevity and financial risks) from the 
 pension provider (employer or State) to the individual: there is a need for 
 better financial education, and the impact of career breaks on adequacy 
 need careful consideration.
• Need for careful design of pay-out phase if adequacy to be properly addressed.
• Charges need to be kept low via regulation.
To conclude, demographic developments as well as the current design 
of pension systems in the EU – with a high reliance on pay-as-you-go 
schemes – have resulted in an increased need to reform EU pension 
arrangements. One way of doing so, is to increase the importance of private 
and funded pension schemes, both in the second and the third pillar. The 
Dutch experience can be of interest in this respect. Not only because The 
Netherlands appear to lead the other EU Member States in this context, 
but also given the relative importance of the second pillar, which – as has 
been elaborated above – has clear advantages over individual, third pillar 
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arrangements. Even though the Dutch system cannot be transferred “one-
on-one to the EU”, the Dutch experience and expertise in this particular 
area – the establishment and management of private pension schemes 
– appears to of interest to other Member States.
Transferability of the Dutch pension system to the European Union 
Methodology 
If indeed an exportable Dutch pension product can be defined and it can 
still be regarded as desirable to market the Dutch pension system abroad, 
the next question that arises is, which markets would potentially be 
fertile grounds for the Dutch pension system. For this purpose a so-called 
transferability index has been constructed, which attempts to give an 
indication which Member States of the EU are most susceptible to the 
introduction of the Dutch pension system. The work done in this area 
is the result of a joint project with Alexander Schwan. To our knowledge 
there has been no similar study that analyses which countries may be 
interesting export markets from the point of view of the Dutch pension 
system. When reference is made to the Dutch pension system in this 
context, we refer to the pension deal as it is common in the Dutch second 
pillar. Hence, no distinction has been made with respect to the individual 
pension products as defined above (Table 2). However, we will come back 
to this at the end of this analysis.
The exportability of the Dutch pension system is, in our view, determined 
by two factors. First, countries that are most susceptible to introducing 
changes in their pension system are those countries that are facing a 
large need for pension reform. These are in particular countries in which 
the current dominant pay-as-you-go old-age pensions are under pressure 
due to demographic developments. In other words, EU Member States 
that have to move from pay-as-you-go to funded schemes are potentially 
interesting export markets. The second factor relates to those elements 
that make a country susceptible to the peculiarities of the Dutch pension 
system. Those countries that bear most similarities with the foundations 
of the Dutch system, in terms of societal, political and social characteristics, 
should be the ones most susceptible to the Dutch pension system.
Hence, the so-called transferability index comprises two sub-indices: 
a so-called reform index and a characteristics index. The reform index 
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is constructed by taking into account factors that characterise (1) the 
current (funded) pension scheme in a country as well as those factors 
that (2) give information about the adequacy and financial sustainability 
of the pension scheme. The characteristics index is based on factors that 
provide information regarding (1) the social and political structure of a 
country, (2) governance and the degree of corporatism in a society21 and 
(3) the state of financial markets and relevant regulation. Figure 3 below 
gives an overview of the sub-indices that determine the transferability 
of the Dutch pension system to the European Union.
Figure 3: Overview of the transferability indices
Tables 5 and 6 below give a more detailed overview of all the relevant 
factors that have been taken into account to construct the sub-indices 
as well as the relevant sources providing data on these factors. A full 
description of the relevant factors can be found in the annex .
21 This index mainly measures the involvement of social partners in the economy
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Table 5: Overview of the building stones of the reform index
Data for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Latvia and Romania were, unfortunately, 
not fully available. Hence, these countries were not taken into account 
when constructing the indices.
In order to construct the indices, all data have been standardised using 
the linear scaling technique (Salzman, 2003). All factor values have been 
normalised to the range of (0, 1), where 0 represents the lowest degree 
of transferability and 1 the highest. When adding, all factors as well as 
the sub-indices have been given equal weight, as there is no reason to 
assume ex ante that some factors or sub-indices should be given more 
weight than others.   
There a number of caveats related to this study that should be 
mentioned, before discussing the results.
First, this analysis regarding the transferability of the Dutch pension system 
to the EU countries only considers macro factors and does not take into 
account micro information that may also be relevant to come to a good 
judgement as to whether countries are interesting export markets or not. 
Factor Impact on transferability Data source
Current scheme
Funded scheme coverage High coverage – low 
transferability
European Commission (2006)
Adequacy of pension funding High adequacy – low 
transferability
IMD (2006)
DB/DC in funded schemes DB – higher transferability SPC (2008)
Mandatory/voluntary 
participation
Voluntary – high 
transferability
SPC (2008)
Social security contribution 
level
High level – low – low 
transferability
IMD (2008)
Adequacy and financial sustainability
Replacement rate projections High rate – low transferability Indicator Sub-Group (2006)
Old-age poverty risk rate High risk – high transferability Eurostat (2008a)
Sustainability gap High gap – high 
transferability
European Commission (2008)
Sustainability risk High risk – high transferability European Commission (2008)
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Indeed, a proper business case study should also comprise a fully-fledged 
market analysis (e.g. main players, competitors, etc.). As such, this study is 
not sufficient to take a decision whether a PDO should enter a particular 
market. However, it does provide a starting point for such a decision.
Second, the choice of the factors comprising the sub-indices has been 
based on a normative assessment of both the need for reform as well 
as the characteristics of the Dutch second pillar schemes. There is no 
or only little theoretical literature on these issues. Hence, it cannot be 
claimed that we have covered all relevant factors or that no factor can be 
omitted. More research is necessary in this respect. In order to ascertain 
that the factors taken into account provide the intuitively correct 
results, the sub-indices have also been constructed for The Netherlands 
themselves. In other words, the results of The Netherlands show whether 
a factor indeed provides the ex ante expected information. In terms of 
the reform index, The Netherlands should score low, whereas in terms 
of the characteristics index, it should score high. This appears to be the 
case for all factors. As a matter of fact, when defining the factors, we 
have – for a number of factors related to the characteristics index – first 
considered the country characteristics as developed by Hofstede (2001). 
Besides the fact that the Hofstede study does not cover all EU Member 
States, the results were in many cases counter-intuitive. For instance, 
The Netherlands scored low on those factors which are regarded as key 
characteristics for the Dutch pension system (e.g. collectivity).   
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Table 6: Overview of the building stones of the characteristics  index
Factor Impact on transferability Data source
Social and political structure
Social cohesion priority of 
government
High cohesion – high 
transferability
IMD (2008)
Social responsibility of 
business leaders
High responsibility – high 
transferability
IMD (2008)
Intergenerational solidarity High solidarity – high 
transferability
European Values Survey 
(2006)
Political constellation Liberal government – low 
transferability
Own research
Financial literacy High literacy – low 
transferability
IMD (2008)
Inflation rate High inflation – low 
transferability
Eurostat (2008b)
Governance and corporatism
Collective bargaining 
coverage
High coverage – high 
transferability
Visser (2004)
Centralisation of wage 
bargaining
High centralisation – high 
transferability
Visser (2004)
Trade union density High density – high 
transferability
Visser (2004)
Trust High trust – high 
transferability
European Commission 
(2005b)
Financial markets and regulation
Volume pension assets High volume – high 
transferability
CBS (2207); OECD (2007)
Stock market capitalisation High capitalisation – high 
transferability
IMD (2008)
Capital market accessibility High accessibility – high 
transferability
IMD (2008)
Banking regulations in favour 
of business developments
Favourable regulation – high 
transferability
IMD (2008)
Number of companies listed 
on stock exchange (IFRS)
High number – high 
transferability
IMD (2008)
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Results
Figure 4 below shows the results for the calculation of the so-called reform index. 
Countries are grouped with respect to their scores vis-à-vis the average of all 
countries under consideration.
Figure  4: Results for the reform index
The first group of countries consists of those EU Member States 
that require reforms in order to increase the sustainability of their 
pension systems, notably in wake of the demographic developments. 
These countries score above average and can be regarded as “high 
transferability” countries, i.e. countries that are deemed to move from 
pay-as-you-go to funded pension schemes. It is interesting to note that 
this group comprises, besides the intuitive “usual suspects”, also Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. Ireland scores rather poor in terms of adequacy 
and financial sustainability of the current schemes. The same holds for 
the United Kingdom. It appears that in particular in the United Kingdom 
the changes in the pension system that took place over the past decade 
were not for the better, on the contrary.      
The second group of countries scoring below average comprises EU 
Member States that are facing a less pressing need for reform. As 
should be expected, The Netherlands is part of this particular group. 
This group, maybe surprisingly, also comprises a number of Central and 
Eastern European countries. These countries are either less affected by 
demographic developments (e.g. Estonia), or have been rather successful 
in establishing funded schemes (e.g. Poland), although mostly of a 
DC nature. By the way, it can be questioned whether the DC schemes 
Main index I: Reform index
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established in these countries are still adequate after the financial crisis. 
The impact of the crisis was obviously not taken into account in the data.
Figure 5 below shows the results for the calculation of the so-called 
characteristics index. Again, countries are grouped with respect to their 
individual scores vis-à-vis the average of all countries under consideration. 
The results show an interesting geographical divide, in the sense that the 
first group – scoring higher than the average – consists of all Western 
European countries plus Spain, and does not include any of the Central and 
Eastern EU Member States. Obviously, The Netherlands is part of this group 
as well. Countries that score very high with respect to this index are, next 
to The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden Finland and Austria. These countries 
do very well in terms of the social and political structure as well as the role 
of social partners (governance and corporatism). The same holds for France 
and Belgium, respectively. Luxembourg scores well on the overall index due 
to its high score in terms of financial markets and regulation.
Figure  5: Results for the characteristics  index
The second group of countries comprises all Central and Eastern 
European countries as well as most Mediterranean EU Member States. 
With the exception of Slovenia and Slovakia, all Central and Eastern 
European countries score poorly in terms of social and political structure; 
all, with the exception of Slovenia, score also low to very low in terms of 
governance and corporatism. All score also low on the financial markets 
and regulation index. As regards the Mediterranean countries, the 
results are more mixed. These countries score in particular low in terms 
Main index II: Characteristics index
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Transferability
of the financial markets and regulation index as well as with respect to 
governance and corporatism. However, Greece and Italy score rather high 
on the social and political structure index.
In order to assess which EU Member States are most susceptible to the 
Dutch pension system, the results with respect the two indices need to be 
combined. This is done in Figure 6 below. The black line shows the result of 
a regression analysis (OLS) that we have done on the scores of the countries 
under consideration with respect to the two indices. We have found a 
negative relation between the reform index and the characteristics index, i.e. 
countries that are confronted with a larger need for reform score lower on 
the characteristics index. In other words, countries that bear similarities with 
The Netherlands, in terms of the sub-indices under consideration, are doing 
better in terms of adequacy and sustainability of their pension schemes. 
Figure 6: Transferability
The countries which, according to our analysis, are most susceptible to 
the Dutch pension system are those countries facing a high need for 
reform and having similar relevant characteristics as The Netherlands’ 
system (quadrant I of Figure 6). This group includes Belgium, Finland 
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
When considering to which EU Member States exporting the Dutch 
pension system would be most interesting, this is the group to look at 
first. 
I
IV
II
III
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The second group, represented by quadrant II, comprises those countries 
which have no large demand for reform and are very similar to The 
Netherlands. As should be the case, The Netherlands is part of this group. 
Other countries in this group are Austria, Denmark and Sweden. Although 
the need for drastic changes in their pension systems appears to be 
limited, these countries might still be interesting to consider in terms of 
exportability of, in particular, elements of the Dutch pension deal, given 
their high scores on the characteristics index. 
The third group is represented by quadrant IV of Figure 6 These countries are 
facing a large need for reform of their pension system, but score relatively low 
on the characteristics index. Countries in this group are the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia. Although this group might, 
at first sight, not be promising in terms of exporting the Dutch pension 
deal, it should be noted that these countries are interesting to consider 
when looking at pension asset management as such. For this service, a high 
similarity with the The Netherlands appears to be less necessary. In other 
words, when considering the exportability of Dutch pension products and 
services – as defined previously – both the countries in quadrant I, II as well 
as quadrant IV deserve the first attention of further analysis and study.
The remaining EU Member States third (quadrant III) are countries that 
apparently are not facing a great urge to reform their pension system. At 
the same time, these countries score also very low in terms of similarities 
with the Dutch system. This group consists of Estonia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia. These would be countries to stay away from when considering to 
export to. 
There is an another interesting conclusion that can be drawn from Figure 
622. From the perspective of quadrants I and IV, representing the Member 
States that should face the largest need for reform, two options for future 
development exist. One possibility is to move from the said quadrants 
to quadrant II, i.e. implementing reforms that bring countries closer to 
the Dutch model. The other possibility is to go in the same direction as a 
number of Central and Eastern European countries has already gone, i.e. to 
move to quadrant III, which actually implies moving away from the Dutch 
22 It can also be concluded that Figure 6 provides interesting information on potential 
 coalitions with respect to the European policy-making process in the area of pensions. 
 Potential allies of The Netherlands appear to be the countries in quadrants I and II.
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model. Countries that have gone this path have done so rather recently, 
and have opted for more individual solutions to establish funded pension 
schemes. As argued above, if not well-designed, the drawbacks of this 
model can be substantial. Hence, an ambition of Dutch PDOs can also be 
to provide the right incentives for those countries still in quadrants I and 
IV, to move to quadrant II. Assuming that EU Member States will indeed 
realise that they have to reform their pension system and, hence, have to 
move, but Dutch PDOs would utterly fail in this respect, the Dutch pension 
system will be even more isolated than it already is. In other words, the 
exportability or transferability of the Dutch pension system is not only 
about commercial opportunities; it is intrinsically linked to the future of 
the Dutch pension system as we know it.
Concluding remarks  
To conclude this lecture I would like to summarise the answers to the 
questions that I posed in my introductory remarks.
1) What are the unique selling points of the Dutch pension system that 
make pensions a product worthwhile exporting to the EU?
There is a clear match between the needs of the EU and the experience 
and the expertise that The Netherlands can offer. Because of demographic 
developments, public (first pillar) pension systems, which still are the 
corner stone of pension systems in the EU, will increasingly come 
under pressure. A pension crisis can be averted by, among other things, 
increasing the importance of private pension schemes, notably the 
second and third pillar pension arrangements. 
The Netherlands appear to be leading in particular in the area of the 
management of private pension schemes, notably second pillar arrangements. 
This leading position can be translated into a clear business model, mainly in the 
area of asset management and pension plan design. Pension administration 
appears to be a less promising proposition, at least at this stage: it requires in 
any case substantial investments, by Dutch PDOs as well as by PDOs based 
in other jurisdictions. Dutch PDOs clearly have a competitive edge with 
respect to cost efficiency, integral pension asset management (in contrast 
to managing individual mandates) and expertise in the area of governance 
and pension plan design. All of them are relevant when establishing a more 
important role for private pension schemes in the EU.
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The transferability of the Dutch pension system is not about exporting 
the Dutch second-pillar model “one on one” to other EU Member States. 
This would be too naïve. Still, some peculiarities of the Dutch second 
pillar appear to be of interest for other EU countries and could be taken 
into account in their pension plan design, in particular as second pillar 
schemes appear to have a number of advantages over individual, third 
pillar schemes. Issues that could be taken into account by other Member 
States relate to (1) governance, and the role of social partners, as to 
– among other things – increase the participation in private pension 
schemes and to promote cost-effectiveness of the management of such 
schemes; and (2) pension plan design, in particular the establishment of 
an adequate pay-out phase, the establishment of collective schemes, the 
role of conditional indexation as an important instrument to manage 
the plan, and financial engineering as to support establishing DC 
solutions that come closer to the more positive results of DB schemes. 
2) Should exporting the Dutch pension system still be a priority under the 
current circumstances?
The exportability of the Dutch pension system does not only concern a pure 
business interest. It is also in the interest of The Netherlands to attempt to 
transfer in particular elements of the second pillar to other EU Member States. 
The Dutch pension system, although applauded by many, is increasingly 
becoming under pressure. To some extent, the Dutch pension sector itself 
can be held responsible for this development, by being too domestically 
oriented. However, the fact that The Netherlands is increasingly becoming 
the odd-one out in the area of pensions, should mainly be attributed to 
external factors, in particular international regulatory developments. By 
exporting the Dutch model to other EU countries, The Netherlands may be 
successful in supporting the continued existence of its own model.
As a matter of fact, it can be argued that the time to look across the 
Dutch borders has never been as topical as currently is the case, contrary 
to what some argue. First, despite the impact of the financial crisis on 
Dutch pension funds, pension schemes abroad are in general faring even 
worse. Indeed, the current circumstances only pronounce the supremacy 
of second pillar arrangements over third pillar, individual schemes. 
Second, in particular the Dutch PDOs that are closely linked to pension 
funds and social partners appear to be in a good position to export 
their proposition abroad. These PDOs represent the “back to basics” 
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philosophy that has seemed to taken hold of the financial industry these 
days, operating on the basis of a completely different incentive structure 
than traditional financial institutions.
3) If the business concept to be exported is clear, which EU countries’ 
grounds are most fertile for the Dutch model?
On the basis of two dimensions – the need for reform and the similarities 
of a country’s pension system with the Dutch model – a so-called 
transferability index has been constructed, which provides more insight 
in those countries that most susceptible to the Dutch model.
EU Member States that are confronted with a high need for reform while 
at the same time scoring high in terms of characteristics of their pension 
system relative to The Netherlands are Belgium, Finland France, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and the United Kingdom. EU Countries that are 
interesting from the point of view of asset management only are the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia. These countries are 
witnessing a relatively large need for reform – and hence well-managed 
private pension schemes – but appear to be less susceptible to the 
Dutch model as a whole. Finally, Austria, Denmark and Sweden appear 
to be interesting markets as well. Although the need for reform in these 
countries is relatively small, these EU Member States’ pension systems bear 
the most resemblance to the Dutch system. In other words, doing business 
with these countries may be relatively easy from a Dutch perspective.
Perhaps most importantly, the research with respect that the 
transferability index shows that EU Member States have two avenues to 
go, when reforming their pension system. One is to go in the direction 
of the Dutch model; the second is to move more into the direction of 
individual, third pillar schemes. As a matter of fact, those countries that 
are increasing or recently have successfully increased the importance of 
private schemes in their jurisdictions – notably Estonia, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia – have all gone this direction. Hence, to avoid full isolation 
of the Dutch model in the EU, it is important that those countries that 
still have to undertake major reform efforts, do not choose the individual 
DC option. Indeed, Dutch PDOs may play an important role in this 
respect, which is beyond a sole business interest of these institutions.
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Annex: Full description of the transferability index factors 
Reform index: current scheme
• Funded scheme coverage: represented by the percentage of 
 employees contributing to private funded schemes (both 2nd and 
 3rd pillar). It is assumed that countries where coverage levels are 
 higher are confronted with a lower need for reform, and hence score 
 lower in terms of transferability,
• Perceived adequacy of pension funding: represents the perceived 
 adequacy of pension funding by the public in a particular country. 
 High adequacy is associated with little need for reform and low 
 transferability.
• DB or DC: it is assumed that countries where DB schemes are 
 most prominent have less demand for reform (and hence face lower 
 transferability) than countries where DC schemes are highly prevalent.
• Mandatory of voluntary: it is assumed that countries where 
 participation in pension schemes is (partially) mandatory have less 
 need to reform their systems (and hence score lower on transferability) 
 than countries where participation is voluntary.
• Social security contribution level: it is assumed that countries 
 where the difference between gross and net salaries is already 
 rather substantial (i.e. high social security contributions) have less 
 leeway in establishing funded schemes. Hence, transferability is lower.
Reform index: adequacy and financial sustainability
• Replacement rate (projections up to 2050): countries which are 
 expected to have low replacement rates have a higher need for 
 reform, and hence score better in terms of transferability.
• Old-age poverty risk rate after social transfers: it is assumed that countries 
 where the old-age poverty risk is highest after social transfers have 
 a higher need for pension reform. Hence, transferability is higher.
• Sustainability gap: represented by computations by the European 
 Commission addressing to which extent public finances in EU 
 Member States are to come under pressure due to demographic 
 developments. A large sustainability gap represents a higher need 
 for reform and higher transferability.
• Sustainability risk: represented by computations by the European 
 Commission addressing the risk to which extent public finances 
Dr. Olaf C.H.M. Sleijpen 49
 in EU Member States are to come under pressure due to demographic 
 developments. A large sustainability risk represents a higher need 
 for reform and higher transferability.
Characteristics index: social and political structure
• Social cohesion priority of government: represents the importance 
 attached by the government with respect to social cohesion. A high 
 score represents high transferability.
• Social responsibility of business leaders: countries where the social 
 responsibility of business leaders is high are assumed to avail 
 of employers and employers’ organisations that give importance to 
 negotiations with trade unions as well as an adequate pension 
 scheme. A high score is associated with high transferability.
• Intergenerational solidarity: measures to which extent the population 
 of a particular countries values intergenerational solidarity. A high 
 score is associated with high transferability.
• Political constellation: the Dutch model is assumed to thrive most 
 in a centre-left or centre-right political environment. A social democrat 
 or left-wing government may be more conducive to the first pillar, 
 state promoted pension scheme. However, worst condition - in terms 
 of transferability – is the existence of a right-wing or liberal 
 government, which is assumed to promote individual DC schemes.
• Financial literacy: countries where people score high in terms of 
 literacy may be best equipped to take care of their pensions 
 themselves, hence these countries score low in terms of transferability. 
 The opposite may be true for countries where literacy is low.
• Inflation rate: inflation is the key enemy of funded schemes. The 
 inflation rate in countries represents the degree of inflation aversion 
 in that country. High inflation rates do not match very well with 
 funded schemes, and vice versa. Hence, high inflation rates are 
 associated with low transferability. 
Characteristics index: governance and corporatism
• Collective bargaining: represents the importance of collective 
 bargaining between social partners in an economy. It is assumed 
 that a high degree of collective bargaining is associated with a high 
 degree of transferability.
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• Centralisation of wage bargaining: represents the degree of centralised 
 power of social partners. A high degree of centralisation is associated 
 with a high degree of transferability.
• Trade union density: represents the importance of trade unions in 
 a particular country. A high trade union density is assumed to be 
 associated with a high degree of transferability.
• Trust: measures the degree of trust in authorities, or institutions and 
 organisations to which authority has been delegated. A high degree 
 of trust is assumed to be associated with high transferability. The 
 Dutch model assumes high trust in the civil society and organisations 
 like employees’ and employers’ organisations, as opposed to countries 
 where there is low trust in official authorities and organisations and 
 citizens prefer to have a high degree of individual freedom.
Characteristics index: financial markets and regulation
• Volume of pension assets: countries with high pensions savings are 
 assumed to have both well-functioning capital markets as well as 
 the relevant knowledge with respect to asset management. A high 
 score on this factor is associated with high transferability.
• Stock market capitalisation: represents the degree of development 
 of the local capital market. A high stock market capitalisation is to 
 be assumed to correlate with high transferability. It should be noted, 
 however, that pension funds – in any case in The Netherlands – 
 invest a substantial part of their assets across their national borders. 
 In other words, the value-added of this factor should not be overstated.
• Capital market accessibility: measures the degree of capital market 
 development as perceived by companies and financial institutions. 
 A high degree of accessibility is assumed to be associated with high 
 transferability. The same caveat as mentioned above applies to this factor.
• Banking regulations in favour of business developments:  measures the 
 degree to which companies and financial institutions perceive 
 banking regulations in a country to be conducive to business 
 developments. A high score is assumed to be associated with high 
 transferability.
• Number of listed companies on the stock exchange: this factor is 
 included to give expression of the likely importance of IFRS 
 accounting rules with respect to pensions in a country. Listed 
 companies are expected to comply with these IFRS rules that, 
 among other things, imply that companies have to include pension 
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 assets and liabilities – in case of a DB scheme - on their balance 
 sheets. The larger the number of listed companies, the more 
 substantial this problem will be. Switching to the Dutch pension 
 system, i.e. notably the establishment of so-called multi-employer 
 pension funds, would alleviate this problem, as the pension assets 
 and liabilities of these funds do not have to be attributed to 
 individual companies. Multi-employer funds may be treated as 
 DC schemes, implying that only contributions in the fund have to be 
 accounted for. In other words, a high score on this factor – the 
 number of listed companies on the stock exchange - is assumed to 
 be associated with high transferability.  
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